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MEASURING COMPLIANCE WITH COMPULSORY
LICENSING REMEDIES IN THE AMERICAN
MICROSOFT CASE
WILLIAM H. PAGE
SELDON J. CHILDERS*

I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2008, Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly extended the term of
all but one of the provisions of the Microsoft final judgments' for two
years on the grounds that there had been "extreme and unforeseen delay" 2 in the implementation of a troublesome provision of the judgments that the parties had already agreed to extend. The provision at
* Professor Page is the Marshall M. Criser Eminent Scholar, University of Florida Levin
College of Law. Mr. Childers is a 2008 graduate (J.D.) from the Levin College of Law at
the University of Florida and was previously a software developer and management consultant (1993-2004). We would like to thank Mark Lemley, David Heiner, Danny Sokol,
and the participants in the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Conference on Remedies for
Dominant Firm Misconduct at the University of Virginia School of Law (June 2008).
1There are two final judgments, a consent decree negotiated by the United States
(joined by some of the state plaintiffs) and ajudgment entered by the court for a group of
states that opposed the consent decree. United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232,
2006 WL 2882808, § IV.A (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2006) (amending the United States and settling
states' final judgment entered Nov. 12, 2002) (Consent Decree 2006), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f218300/218339.pdf; New York v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1233,
2006 WL 3949168, § IV.B (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2006) (amending the nonsettling states' final
judgment entered Nov. 1, 2002). The judgments are very similar. For convenience, in the
remainder of the article, we will cite only to the Consent Decree and the relevant section
number.
Because of the many opinions in the Microsoft litigation, the custom of numbering opinions by Roman numeral for citation (e.g., Microsoft V) is impractical. Consequently, we
adopt the citation strategy of WILLAm H. PAGE &JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFr CASE:
ANTITRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 203-42 (2007), which includes
the court, date, and a citation of the volume and page number (e.g., D.D.C. States Remedy
2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 269).
2New York v. Microsoft Corp., 531 F. Supp. 2d 141, 144 (D.D.C. 2008) (D.D.C.Decree
Extension 2008). In April 2009, the parties agreed to extend the "Surviving Provisions" of
the final judgments, including § III.E, at least until May 12, 2011.Joint Motion to Modify
Final Judgment and Supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities, United States v.
Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://www.usdojgov/
atr/cases/f244900/244921.pdf. Judge Kollar-Kotelly agreed to the extension. Second
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issue, Section II.E, requires Microsoft to "make available," including by
licensing its intellectual property (IP),' certain communications protocols that Windows client operating systems use to interoperate with
Microsoft's server operating systems. 4 Interestingly, the extension came
at the request of only some of the state plaintiffs5 and over the objection
6
of the United States.
In extending the judgments, 7 the court found that Microsoft's failure
to comply with the (already extended) protocol licensing requirement,
in particular its five-year delay in supplying satisfactory technical documentation supporting the protocols, constituted "changed circumstances."8 Moreover, according to Judge Kollar-Kotelly, because of the
provision's "forward-looking" character, it had "paramount significance
in the Final Judgments' scheme,"9 not only in itself but also in its relationship to other provisions. Consequently, she also extended the other
provisions at least until November 2009 to give the judgments a better
chance of having their planned effect.
We do not discuss whether or in what circumstances shortcomings in
compliance with one provision of a consent decree should justify the
extension of others. Instead, we will focus on the issue of compliance
with the documentation element of the protocol licensing requirement.
Modified Final Judgment, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232, § V.A (D.D.C.
Apr. 22, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f245100/245110.pdf.
3 For discussion of policy issues in compulsory licensing of IP as an antitrust remedy,
see Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of
PharmaceuticalsHurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853 (2003); Daniel Kanter, IP and
Compulsory Licensing on Both Sides of the Atlantic-An AppropriateAntitrust Remedy or a Cutback
on Innovation, 2006 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 27(7), 351; Lawrence Schlam, Compulsory
Royalty-Free Licensing as an Antitrust Remedy for PatentFraud: Law, Policy and the Patent-Antitrust Interface Revisited, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 467 (1998).
4 Consent Decree 2006, supra note 1, § III.E.
5 The moving states included some states from the original New York Group, which
joined the United States in the settlement with Microsoft, and some from the California
Group, which did not settle. Id. at 143 n.2. The California movants were California, Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia. The New
York Movants were New York, Maryland, Louisiana, and Florida. Id.
6Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to the Motions to Extend
the States' Final Judgments, New York v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1233 (D.D.C. filed Nov.
9, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f227500/227585.pdf. The disagreement among the plaintiffs, once again, casts doubt on the merits of fragmenting authority
to enforce national antitrust policy. See PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 1, at 246.
7 The motions and the eventual extension did not include § III.B, which required
Microsoft to license Windows to computer manufacturers on uniform terms, with certain
exceptions. D.D.C. Decree Extension 2008, 531 F. Supp. at 144 n.5.
8 Id. at 144, 184. She did not find that Microsoft's actions constituted "a pattern of
willful and systematic violations." Id. at 167 (quoting Consent Decree 2006, supra note 1,
§ V.B).
9
D.D.C. Decree Extension 2008, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 181.
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As we explain more fully below, this provision was problematic from the
outset because it did not respond directly to any proven antitrust violation by Microsoft. Monopolization remedies should usually aim to remove impediments that proven violations place in the way of entry,
innovation, and expansion. The protocol licensing remedy, by contrast,
imposed an affirmative obligation, essentially unrelated to any proven
violations, to facilitate possible future entry by unknown firms and technologies. Many of the problems the court and the parties have encountered in enforcing the provision can be traced to this high ambition.
Even assuming that the protocol licensing requirement was warranted, we question whether Judge Kollar-Kotelly applied the proper
measure of compliance. She held that Microsoft had delayed implementation of the decree by failing to produce "certifiably complete, accurate, and useable"10 documentation of its protocols. In practice, this
standard requires something approaching perfection: Microsoft must
deliver documentation that generates no technical issues during testing
by the plaintiffs' engineers. Microsoft, for whatever reason, did not formally contest this standard. Nevertheless, we argue that this standard is
unnecessarily costly and divorced from market realities. In software development, as in any other practical endeavor, "the perfect is the enemy
of the good."" To illustrate this point, we compare the court's standard
of compliance with the sort of practices a firm would adopt to bring a
software development kit to market. We propose a market-based standard that focuses the question of compliance on the defendant's responsiveness to the interoperability needs of real-world developers.
Finally, we note that the approach applied by the European Commission
in evaluating Microsoft's compliance with its 2004 decision is similar to
our proposed standard.
II. THE FINALJUDGMENTS
In June 2001, the D.C. Circuit held that Microsoft had monopoly
power in the market for PC operating systems and had violated Section
2 of the Sherman Act by trying to thwart a threat to its monopoly posed
by the Netscape Web browser and by Sun's Java technologies. 12 The
browser and Java, separately or together, were "middleware"-applications with platform capabilities-that might have evolved into general

10Id. at 144,

163, 170, 175 (twice), 181, 183 n.34, 184.
" Scott Kieff, IP Transactions: On the Theory & Practice of Commercializing Innovation,42
Hous.L. REv. 727, 731 (2005) (quoting THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 716
(Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1996) (attributing the saying to VOLTAIRE, DICTIONNAIRE
PHILOSOPHIQUE (1770))).

12United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (D.C. Circuit2001).
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platforms for software applications and, thus, diminished the "applications barrier to entry" that protected Microsoft's monopoly in PC operating systems. 13 Some of Microsoft's contractual and design measures,
the court held, prevented potential competitors from achieving the critical mass of users necessary for them to evolve into rival platforms. 14 The
court of appeals also reversed some of the district judge's liability rulings 5 and his remedy, which included a breakup of Microsoft. t Consequently, the court of appeals remanded the case to a new judge with
instructions to formulate a remedy more closely tailored to the surviving
grounds of liability. 7
After remand, with the encouragement of newly assigned Judge Kollar-Kotelly, the United States and some of the states reached agreement
with Microsoft on the terms of a consent decree,' 8 while other state
plaintiffs continued the litigation in hopes of gaining more extensive
relief.' 9 In two parallel proceedings, Judge Kollar-Kotelly considered
whether the proposed consent decree was in the public interest 2° and
whether the nonsettling states were entitled to more relief.2 Ultimately,
she approved the consent decree 22 and entered a separate judgment
granting essentially identical relief to the nonsettling states.2 3 The twin
judgments went into effect in November 2002 and were due to expire
five years later. 24 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the judgments in their entirety in 2004.25
In this Part, we briefly describe the terms of the judgments and the
problems that Microsoft and the plaintiffs have encountered in securing
compliance with their terms. In doing so, we suggest that, the judg-

1'

Id. at 53-54.

14Id. at 60-74 (describing measures affecting Netscape); id. at 74-78 (describing mea-

sures aimed at Java).
15Id. at 75, 80-81.
16Id. at 98.
17Id. at 105-07.
'8 Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232, 8-9
(D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f222900/222994.
pdf.
19New York v. Microsoft Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2002).
20 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 215 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2002).
21 New York v. Microsoft Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2002).
2 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 192 (D.D.C. 2002) (D.D.C.
Tunney Act 2002).
23 New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 266-77 (D.D.C. 2002) (D.D.C. States
Remedy 2002), affd sub noma.Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (D.C. Circuit 2004 Remedy).
2
4 See supra note 1.
25 D.C. Circuit 2004 Remedy, 373 F.3d at 1224, 1250.
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ments' adoption of mandatory licensing in the absence of a proven
market need made the difficulties of enforcement that lay ahead
predictable.
A. TERMS
The terms of the final judgments corresponded closely, but not perfectly, to the liability rulings the court of appeals affirmed. 26 The judgments, for example, seek to prevent Microsoft from contracting with
computer manufacturers or designing Windows in ways that limit its ri27
vals' ability to install or promote middleware on new Windows PCs.
Parallel provisions aim to prevent Microsoft from limiting its rivals'
other access to channels of distribution by exploiting its control over
software developers, hardware vendors, Internet access and content
providers, and end users.2s Each of these provisions is responsive, directly or indirectly, to some contractual or design action that the court
of appeals held unlawful. 29 Some of Microsoft's conduct that the court
found to be unlawful is not addressed in the final judgments at all. 0
In two provisions that the court described as "forward-looking," however, the final judgments exceeded the liability rulings. One of these
provisions requires Microsoft to disclose to affected firms the applications programming interfaces (APIs) that Windows uses to interoperate
with Microsoft's own middleware products, like Internet Explorer and
Microsoft Media player.3' This provision is designed to assure that
Microsoft does not use special knowledge of its APIs to gain an advantage over rivals in the markets for middleware products. The "most forward-looking provision," 32 Section III.E, requires Microsoft to "make
available" to interested firms:
on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (consistent with Section
III.1 [which requires licensing of necessary intellectual property33]) any
Communications Protocol that is . . . (i) implemented in a Windows
26 D.D.C. Decree Extension 2008, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 150-54.
27 The decree defines various categories of Microsoft and non-Microsoft middleware.
Consent Decree 2006, supra note 1, §§ VI.J, VIK, VIM, VI.N. The decree also preserves
computer manufacturers' flexibility to delete Microsoft products and to install and enable
access to those of rivals. Id. §§ IlI.C, III.H.
28 Id. §§ III.F, III.G.
2 For more discussion, see PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 1, at 71-76.
30 Id. at 77 (discussing actions that may have deceived developers into writing to the
Windows-specific version of Java).
31Consent Decree 2006, supra note 1, § III.D.
32
D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 173.
33This section requires Microsoft to license its intellectual property with reasonable
and nondiscriminatory royalties and limitations.
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Operating System Product installed on a client computer, and (ii)
used to interoperate, or communicate, natively [i.e., without the addition of other software] with a Microsoft server operating system
product.34
Implementation of this provision has posed so many difficulties that the
court felt compelled to extend most of the judgments' other provisions.
As we have explained elsewhere, 5 Section III.E has little to do with
the liability holdings in the case.3 6 It and the API disclosure provision
are based on a widely held belief that Microsoft manipulates its Windows
interfaces to disadvantage its rivals in applications markets. 3 An early
version of this charge was the popular saying "[MS-] DOS isn't done
until Lotus [1-2-3, once a rival spreadsheet program] won't run." 38 A
later version of the charge appeared in the famous Netscape White Paper that provided the impetus and conceptual foundation for the gov40
ernment's case. 39 The complaint, however, did not include the charge.
The charge only resurfaced after the trial on liability, during the negotiations over the appropriate remedy. 41 The government apparently believed that Microsoft had already ceased most of the conduct at issue in
the case. However, the government insisted on including a provision
intended to hinder Microsoft's ability to extend its dominance into network computing because the computer market was moving in the direction of network-based applications that users can access either within
42
corporate local networks or over the Internet.
The rationale for the protocol licensing provision was that server operating systems are platforms for middleware comparable to client operating systems. 43 Middleware running on non-Microsoft servers might

31 Id.

at 269.

31 William

H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Software Development as an Antitrust Remedy:
Lessons from the Enforcement of the Microsoft CommunicationsProtocol Licensing Requirement, 14
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 77 (2007), available at http://www.mttlr.org/vol
fourteen/page.pdf.
36D.D.C. 2002 Tunney Act, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 189 (observing that "this aspect of the
remedy plainly exceeds the scope of liability"); D.C. Circuit 2004 Remedy, 373 F.3d at 1223.
37 Page & Childers, supra note 35, at 93.
38 For a Microsoft employee's investigation of this charge, see Adam Barr, DOS Ain't
Done til Lotus Won't Run? (Aug. 1, 2005), http://www.proudlyserving.com/archives/
2005/08/dos aintdone t.html.
3
9 Gary Reback & Susan Creighton, White Paper Regarding Recent Anticompetitive
Conduct of Microsoft Corporation (July 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). For discussion, see PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 1, at 28-29.
40Page & Childers, supra note 35, at 95-96.
41 See KEN AULETrA, WORLD WAR

42 Page
4

3.0: MICROSOFT

AND ITs ENEMIES

& Childers, supra note 35, at 96-103.
5D.D.C. Tunney Act 2002, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 189-90.

340-62 (2001).
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evolve into a platform rival for Windows." Consequently, it was thought,
developers of middleware that would run on those server operating systems should have access to the same communications protocols that
Windows client operating systems use to communicate with applications
running on Microsoft server operating systems. The provision, according to Judge Kollar-Kotelly, "acknowledges the continuing change in the
industry [toward network computing] and expands appropriately from
the imposition of liability" to assure that "the core of the decree [will
not] prove prematurely obsolete. '45 In her opinion extending the judgments, she characterized Section III.E as "the cornerstone" of the remeto have
dies and "the basis on which the parties and the Court aspired
46
the applications barrier to entry broken down over time."
Recognizing that Section III.E and other provisions would pose technical challenges, the consent decree provides for the creation and maintenance, at Microsoft's expense, 47 of a Technical Committee (TC) of
"experts in software design and programming" 48 to "monitor Microsoft's
compliance" 49 and report to the plaintiffs regularly. 50 The TC can investigate complaints,51 gather information from Microsoft,52 and study
Microsoft's source code. 53 Although its members must be unbiased 54 in
the sense of not having financial or professional interests for or against
Microsoft, the TC "exists to assist the government in enforcing the decree." 55 It is thus an instrumentality of the plaintiffs and not a neutral
arbiter of disputes over enforcement. Although the nonsettling states'
judgment, at the states' own request, did not provide for a technical
committee,5 6 those plaintiffs hired a technical consultant who has
44D.D.C.States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 129 (observing that § III.E keeps open
"the new model of the 'platform threat'").
45D.D.C. Tunney Act 2002, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 202 (holding that § III.E is "appropriately
forward-looking," and "closely connected with the theory of liability in this case").
46
D.D.C. Decree Extension 2008, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 181.
47Consent Decree 2006, supra note 1, § IV.B.6-8.
48 Id. § IV.B.2.
49Id. § IV.B.8.a.
50Id.§ IV.B.8.e.
51Id. § IV.B.8.d.
5

2 Id. § IV.B.8.b.
53Id. § IV.B.8.c. Unlike the final judgment proposed to the trial judge, the consent
decree does not require the disclosure of Windows source code to third parties. Judge
Kollar-Kotelly held that this provision allowed all of the access necessary to the legitimate
concerns of the decree. D.D.C. Tunney Act 2002, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 193.
54The decree disqualifies individuals with ties to Microsoft or its opponents. Consent
Decree 2006, supra note 1,§ IV.B.I. It provides that each side will select a member and
those two will select the third, all to serve five-year, renewable terms. Id. § IV.B.3-4.
55
D.D.C. 2002 Tunney Act, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
56D.D.C. States'Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 182.
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worked so closely with the TC that court and the parties view them as a
57
single entity.
Several characteristics of Section III.E should have warned the parties
and the court of the enforcement problems that lay ahead. Antitrust
recognizes a presumptive right to refuse to deal, a right that courts override only in narrowly defined circumstances. 5 This qualified right rests
on a recognition that mandatory contracting is less likely than free contracting to produce wealth-enhancing agreements,5 9 and that "[e]nforced sharing... requires antitrust courts to act as central planners,
identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing-a
role for which they are ill suited." 6 Courts will compel a defendant to
deal only in limited circumstances. For example, it is a necessary, but
not a sufficient, condition for mandatory dealing that rivals "cannot effectively compete without [the resources] and that duplication or practical alternatives are not available." 61 Mandatory dealing may also be
inappropriate if a defendant has not "voluntarily engaged in a course of
dealing with its rivals," 62 which it terminated for no plausible business
63
reason.
The protocol licensing provision runs counter to these considerations. It is forward-looking, but not merely in the sense that it aims to
foreclose the defendant's illegal acts in a different, future technological
context. It aims to foreclose acts that the government did not prove had
57

1 D.D.C. Decree Extension 2008, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 157 n.25.
58NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998) (observing that "the freedom
of the individual right to contract when not unduly or improperly exercised [is] the most
efficient means for the prevention of monopoly") (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911)); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)
(observing that a trader has a right "freely to exercise his own independent discretion as
to parties with whom he will deal" absent an intent to monopolize).
59William H. Page, Mandatory Contracting Remedies in the American and European
Microsoft Cases, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 787 (2009); John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Bargaining and Monopolization: In Search of the "Boundary of Section 2 Liability" Between Aspen
and Trinko, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 115, 124-26 (2005).

60Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004).
61Phillip Areeda, EssentialFacilities:An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles,58 ANTITRUST
L.J. 841, 852 (1989). For criticism of Areeda's approach, see Spencer Weber Waller,
Areeda, Epithets, and Essential Facilities,2008 Wis. L. REv. 359.
62Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
63Compare Covad Commc'ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1049 (11th Cir.
2004) ("Trinko now effectively makes the unilateral termination of a voluntary course of
dealing a requirement for a valid refusal-to-deal claim under Aspen."), with Helicopter
Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Erickson Air-Crane Inc., No. 06-3077-PA, 2008 WL 151833, at *9
n.10 (D. Or. Jan. 14, 2008) ("Trinko said no such thing.").

2009]

MEASURING COMPLIANCE IN U.S. MICROSOFT CASE

247

ever occurred in any context. 64 Even if we assume that the remedy responds, in a broad sense, to Microsoft's illegal conduct, it goes beyond
accepted prudential limitations on mandatory dealing. It involves complex technical questions that are beyond the court's understanding and,
thus, required the creation of a technical committee. It imposes a duty
of dealing, even though Microsoft had not terminated a profitable
course of licensing its protocols; indeed, unlike the API licensing requirement, the affected protocols had never been formally documented, even within Microsoft. 65 The order thus required Microsoft to
unearth functionality that "exist[ed] only deep within the bowels" of
Windows and that required the creation of altogether "[n]ew systems
simply to make ... access possible." 66 As we note below, Microsoft
...
and two external consulting firms have had to scrutinize the source code
of Windows to identify the protocols and protocol elements it
contained.
Finally, Section III.E required dealing, even though there was no evidence that there were many firms that wanted what the court was ordering. Granted, few firms could have known enough about the protocols,
given Microsoft's control over them, to decide whether they would be
useful. 67 But, as Judge Kollar-Kotelly recognized, " [t] here are a variety of
methods [other than native interoperation] used to overcome differences between client and server capabili ties." 8 Some of these methods,
such as reliance on generic industry-standard protocols supported in
Windows or addition of new software to the client are more widely used
and, thus, preferable to native interoperation for many developers. Efforts to assess interest in licensing the protocols began in earnest only
after the entry of the judgment. As the court of appeals observed in
warily affirming the provision, there are "difficulties inherent in crafting

64 If, despite the considerations underlying the presumptive right to refuse to deal, the
court finds that a refusal to deal is unlawful, then compulsory licensing may be an appropriate remedy. For discussion of this issue, see U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade
Comm'n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation
and Competition 22-23 (2007), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.
pdf. In Microsoft, none of the proven violations involved a refusal to provide compatibility
information.
6 See D.D.C. Decree Extension 2008, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 164.

Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410.
One exception is the Samba project, which uses protocol analysis to create products
that emulate Microsoft server operating systems. William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers,
Bargainingin the Shadow of the European Microsoft Decision: The Microsoft-Samba Protocol License, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 332, 335 (2008), available at http://www.law.north
western.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/16/LRCoII2008n I6Page&Childers.pdf.
6 D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 122.
6
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a forward-looking provision concerning a type of business conduct as to
69
which there has not been a violation of the law."
B.

IMPLEMENTATION

Section III.E has proven to be by far the most difficult provision of the
final judgments to implement. 70 We have detailed the tumultuous history of enforcement of Section III.E elsewhere, 7'. and Judge KollarKotelly, in her opinion extending the judgments, goes over the same
ground. 71 In this Part, we will limit our discussion to three principal
themes that have emerged from the experience. First, the parties, after
years of wrangling, have resolved many issues relating to pricing or
terms of access to the licenses and documentation. Microsoft delivered
the first version of the license and 5,000 pages of technical documentation in August 2002. 7 3 The plaintiffs focused their early compliance efforts on making the terms of the license more attractive 74 and on
"evangelizing" the protocols to developers. 75 Even though the final judgments allow Microsoft to charge a reasonable royalty and impose reasonable restrictions on the licenses, Microsoft has repeatedly reduced both
the price of the license and the restrictions on its use 76 until both now
approach zero. In 2006, Microsoft announced a temporary royalty holiday, 77 which was later .extended indefinitely. 78 In 2008, Microsoft went

69D.C. Circuit 2004 Remedy, 373 F.3d at 1223.
70Judge Kollar-Kotelly identified six enforcement issues that have arisen apart from
§ II.E. D.D.C. Decree Extension 2008, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 158.
71Page & Childers, supra note 35, at 112-26.
7
2D.D.C. Decree Extension 2008, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 158-64.
73U.S. Dep't of Justice, Microsoft Consent Decree Compliance Advisory (Apr. 21,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200900/200957.pdf.; Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments, United States v. Microsoft
Corp., No. 98-1232, at 22 (D.D.C. filedJuly 17, 2003) [hereinafterJSRJuly 2003], available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201100/201135.pdf.
74
JSRJuly 2003, supra note 73, at 8-9.
75Interim Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at
10-11, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201300/201386.pdf.
76
Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 15,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2004), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f202100/202129.pdf.
77joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 12,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2006) [hereinafter JSR
August 2006], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f218000/218096.pdf.
78
Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 5-6,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. June 19, 2007), available at http://
ag.ca.gov/cms-pdfs/press/2007-06-19 FinalJSR.pdf.
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further still and made all of the documentation available free on its Web
site as part of its newly adopted "Interoperability Principles."7 9
Second, the parties have resolved any issues concerning technical support for licensees. The plaintiffs have insisted that Microsoft provide
whatever technical assistance any developer might want to implement
the protocols. Microsoft has offered increasing amounts of technical
support to licensees," apparently far more than any licensee has actually
used. It has given licensees access to Windows source code 8' as well as
other forms of support, including dedicated account managers, 82 "plugfests," 8s and an interoperability lab, 84 that have sometimes gone begging
85
for participants.
Third, despite the expenditure of staggering amounts of money and
brainpower over six years, the parties have not resolved issues concerning the documentation of the protocols. The government has, from the
outset, interpreted Section III.E to require disclosures "sufficient... to
allow licensees fully to utilize all the functionality of each Communications Protocol."86 The plaintiffs have argued, and Judge Kollar-Kotelly
79Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 12,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. Feb. 29, 2008) [hereinafter JSR
February 2008], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f230600/230647.pdf. The
program commits to licensing specified proprietary protocols at lower rates than they had
been licensed under the MCPP. See Microsoft Corp., Interoperability Principles: Open
Connections, Standards Support, Data Portability (Feb. 21, 2008), http://www.microsoft.
com/interop/principles/defaultmspx.
80 Supplemental Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 10, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2131OO/213109.pdf (offering 500 hours of free
technical support and consulting package to each licensee).
8
' Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the FinalJudgments at 4, United
States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2006) [hereinafter JSR February
2006], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f214500/214518.pdf.
82 More than half of the licensees have signed up for this form of support. Joint Status
Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 9-10, United States v.
Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. June 17, 2008) [hereinafterjSRJune 2008], available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f234100/234119.pdf.
83 Id. at 14. A plug-fest is an event in which Microsoft engineers help developers test
and debug protocols the developers use with their products. JSR August 2006, supra note
77, at 6.
84JSRJune 2008, supra note 82, at 13. An interoperability lab is a facility that provides
"training, best practices, trouble-shooting and technical support for licensees implementing protocols from the MCPP documentation." JSR August 2006, supra note 77, at 6.
85
JSR Februay 2008, supra note 79, at 19-20;Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 17-18, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232
(D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2007) [hereinafter JSR March 2007], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/cases/f221700/221759.pdf.
86 Competitive Impact Statement at 36, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232,
(D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2001), available athttp://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f222900/222994.pdf.
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has agreed, that Microsoft must provide "certifiably complete, accurate,
and useable" documentation. The TC has measured Microsoft's compliance with this requirement against three successive sets of technical
standards the parties have adopted over the years.8 7 The TC's principal
method of assuring the adequacy of the documentation under these
standards has been to develop prototype implementations of each protocol. 8 When the TC staff encounters a problem in the development
process, it reports the problem to Microsoft as a bug or Technical Documentation Issue (TDI), which is given a priority level, depending upon
its perceived importance. The TC's measure of the adequacy of
Microsoft's documentation is the success of the TC's software engineers
in creating working prototypes: the accumulation of unresolved TDIs
quantifies Microsoft's shortcomings in compliance.8 9 Microsoft has contributed to the testing process with a number of initiatives, including
developing "protocol parsers" that allow engineers to view protocols in
real-time network traffic, 90 and "test suites" that parallel the prototype
implementations. 91
In the spring of 2006, the accumulation of unresolved TDIs became
so great that the parties were forced to rethink the process. Microsoft's
senior vice president Robert Muglia concluded that the "process of trying to fix issues identified by the TC one at a time" was not working and
that Microsoft must "rewrite substantial portions of the documentation,
taking advantage of what it has learned during the last several years,
including all of the specific reports from the TC."92 This "reset" required
the parties to agree on a new "overarching specification" with a series of
93
five "milestones" for Microsoft's delivery of rewritten documentation.
The final judgments require Microsoft to make the protocols available "for use" in
interoperation.
17 Page & Childers, supra note 35, at 122.
81 See, e.g., Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at
3-4, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2005) [hereinafterjSR
January 2005], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2O7200/207283.pdf.
See, e.g., JSR February 2006, supra note 81, at 8.
JSRJanuay 2005, supra note 88, at 5. The grander version of the parser plan, called
Project Troika, turned out to be overly ambitious and was later scaled back. Page &
Childers, supra note 35, at 119-20. Judge Kollar-Kotelly identified these failures as evidence of Microsoft's failure to commit adequate resources to the project. D.D.C. Decree
Extension 2008, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 160-61.
91
JSR March 2007, supra note 85, at 17. The test suites resemble the prototype implementations, but test the documentation against the Windows code rather than an implementation.
92
Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 6, United
States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. May 12, 2006), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f216100/216127.pdf.
93JSR August 2006, supra note 77, at 13.
89
90
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Microsoft has completed that process and delivered the new documentation, 94 which now exceeds 25,000 pages. 95 The parties also agreed to
modify the final judgment to extend the protocol licensing requirement
for at least two years and to require Microsoft to keep Muglia in charge
of the documentation project.96 The process of testing both the pre-reset and post-reset documentation by the use of prototype implementations continues, and new TDIs continue to arise. Microsoft's own testing
also continues.9 7 The process has been complicated by Microsoft's discovery of several new protocols in Windows source code. 98 Microsoft and
two external consulting firms have scoured Windows source code to
identify any other overlooked protocols. 99
In a recent status report, the plaintiffs referred to a relatively new
commitment from Microsoft to produce "overview documents that explain how the MCPP protocols work together" in "complex scenarios."10°
The plaintiffs emphasized that the documentation was "essential" to resolve "numerous" issues with the documentation and that it "disagrees"
with Microsoft about the necessity of the documentation under the Final Judgments.101 The disagreement is a reference to Microsoft's position, expressed in its portion of the status report, that the TC's request
for "subsystem documents" exceeds "the scope of the Final Judgments
because it requires Microsoft to document system information that is
not necessary for licensees to make use of the Communications protocols.' 0 2 Nevertheless, Microsoft has agreed to produce nineteen of these
"complex[ ], volum[inous], and novel[ ]" documents by March 2009.103
This new undertaking has the potential to generate significant conflict,
depending upon how far the TC presses its demands for documentation
of multiple scenarios. The plaintiffs warned in a 2008 status report that
94 JSR February 2008, supra note 79, at 3.
95
Wolfgang Grieskamp et al., Model-Based Quality Assurance of Windows Protocol
Documentation § 1,http://research.microsoft.com/users/wrwg/ICST08.pdf.
96 Consent Decree 2006, supra note 1, § IV.E.
97 JSRJune 2008, supra note 82, at 13. For a description of Microsoft's testing process,
see Grieskamp et al., supra note 95.
98
JSR March 2007, supra note 85, at 11.
99JSR February 2008, supra note 79, at 5-6. Microsoft calls its audit process "Project
Sydney." The first external consulting firm generated a report that led to additional training of Microsoft staff involved in the project. The second firm applied separate "programmatic methods for searching the Windows source code to identify communications
protocols that should have been identified by Project Sydney." Id. at 5. This process had
uncovered additional "protocol elements."
100Id. at 3.
101Id. at 3-4.
102
Id. at 15.
03
JSRJune 2008, supra note 82, at 10-11.
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"experience in preparing the system documents over time may result in
changes to the current list of nineteen documents such as adding additional documents, combining documents, or shifting subject matter be10 4
tween documents."
III. THE COURT'S MEASURE OF COMPLIANCE
Surveying the experience of Section III.E enforcement in her January
2008 opinion, Judge Kollar-Kotelly saw a history of Microsoft's failures:
[A] t the time that the Court entered the Final Judgments, all parties
involved anticipated that the technical documentation required under
Section III.E would be released, at the latest, by February 2003. Instead, five years later, the rewrite of the technical documentation has
only recently been completed, the corresponding overview/reference
materials are not available to licensees, and the testing of the revised
technical documentation is far from finished. As such, no one can
deny that licensees do not yet have access to a set of usable, accurate,
and certifiably complete technical documentation, as contemplated0 5°by
Section III.E and by the Court's various remedy-related opinions.
These failures, "attributed solely to Microsoft," 0 6 constituted the unforeseen change in circumstances that required extending other provisions
of the final judgments for two more years.
As we explain in detail below, the court referred to three factors in
evaluating compliance: (1) Microsoft's commitment of resources and
cooperation with the plaintiffs; (2) the number of licensees of the protocols and the number and type of products being produced under the
licenses; and (3) the number of unresolved TDIs generated by the TC's
testing process. Although the court found the first two of these factors
relevant in some respects, it was ultimately the third that was decisive.
Microsoft had failed to produce documentation that is certifiably complete, usable, and accurate, and will not be in compliance until it does
so. We suggest that this standard takes insufficient account of market
realities. The shortcomings of the court's approach become clear in Part
IV, where we compare the compliance program with standard industry
practice in competitive software development.

101
Id. at 5.
105 D.D.C Decree Extension 2008, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 170.
106 d.at 174.
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RESOURCES AND COOPERATION

Judge Kollar-Kotelly viewed the record of Microsoft's cooperation
with the plaintiffs and its commitment of resources to the documentation project as a mixed bag. On the one hand, the court found that:
Microsoft has been overwhelmingly cooperative with the Plaintiffs and
the TC over the past five years [and has been willing] to address issues
as they arose and to negotiate solutions rather than force litigation. In
many respects, Microsoft's conduct has been10 7a model for parties engaged in complex and protracted litigation.
The repeated negotiations "have achieved a worthy goal by obviating the
need for compliance-related litigation [so that] the Court has never
08
been asked to find Microsoft out of compliance with Section III.E."1
Moreover, Microsoft has committed enormous resources to the task. It
continuously increased its staff devoted, at least in part, to compliance
from ten in July 2003109 to eighty-three by March 2006110 to 210 in May
2006,111 and to 630 by January 2008.112
However, more than five years after the judgments called for the protocols to be available, "licensees do not yet have the benefit of a certifiably complete, accurate, and useable set of technical documentation."" 3
Whatever the difficulties it faced, "Microsoft is culpable for this inexcusable delay"' 14 and "practically speaking . . . has failed to comply with
Section III.E." 115 Indeed, according to the court, Microsoft admitted its
failure to comply by conceding that, before the reset, it "'didn't have
the exact right resources [or] the right process in place' ' 116 until its
most recent increase in staffing. Although, admittedly, Section III.E "required Microsoft to document protocols that had never before been
documented ... Microsoft should have recognized the problems with its
documentation attempts earlier, and directed the appropriate resources

107Id. at 181.
108Id. at 163.
109Id. at 161.
n 0 Id. at 164 n.28.
I D.D.C. Decree Extension 2008, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 161.
112 Id. at 162 n.26. The number had grown to 750 by June 2008. JSR June 2008, supra
note 82, at 14.
"3D.D.C. Decree Extension 2008, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 170.
114Id.
"

5

at 163.
Id. at 181.

116Id.

at 164 (citations omitted).
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towards creating the necessary documentation." 1 7 Now, however, it apparently has "finally committed the resources necessary"" to comply. 19
This characterization of Microsoft's culpability depends upon the criterion of compliance. It is certainly the case that Microsoft, even with
the latest commitment of resources, has failed to produce documentation that does not yield large numbers of TDIs that are difficult to resolve. It is not clear, however, that this criterion is the appropriate one.
The number of TDIs is presumably related to the quality of the documentation in an abstract sense. But that number is also related to the
TC's choice to test the documentation by creating prototype implementations of each protocol, then reporting every problem it encountered
in that process as a TDI. Even though Microsoft has agreed to make best
efforts to comply with the plaintiffs' demands, if the TDI's testing model
is inefficient, Microsoft can hardly be said to be solely culpable for failing to produce a "certifiably complete" response. As we will discuss below, a more appropriate criterion for compliance with the
documentation requirement should be drawn from industry standards
for competitive firms and developer needs.
B.

LICENSEES AND PRODUCTS

Despite the improvements in the documentation after the*reset, the
relaxation of the terms of the license, and the provision of unlimited
technical support, the number of licensees under the program has remained low. In July 2003, one year after the release of the initial version
of the technical documentation, there were only four licensees.120 By
February 2008, the number had increased to forty-seven, of which only
sixteen were actually producing products.' 21 All of those products relate
to specific server tasks. Although six companies have obtained general
server licenses, none has produced a "general server product," presumably the kind most likely to develop into a rival platform, the procompeti22
tive scenario envisioned in the decree.
In the extension proceedings, the moving states argued that the failure of licensees to produce a general server product justified extending
"1
"

8

Id. at 164.
Id. at 182.

119Microsoft noted that "[s ] ignificant attention to and involvement in the technical documentation and the MCPP extend through all levels of the Microsoft organization and
draw upon the resources of numerous product engineering, business, technical, and legal
groups, as well as company management." JSR February 2008, supra note 79, at 20.
2
' 0JSRJuly 2003, supra note 73, at 22.
21
JSR Februay 2008, supra note 79, at 14.
12D.D.C. Decree Extension 2008, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 175.
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the final judgments. Judge Kollar-Kotelly disagreed. Although Section
III.E was premised on the possibility that a middleware platform might
run on a non-Microsoft server, she noted, the fact that present licensees
had not developed a product with those capabilities did not mean that
the provision had failed. First, a present or future licensee may yet develop a general server product. She expected "that the MCPP will continue to attract licensees . . . and that once certifiably complete,

accurate, and useable technical documentation is available to those
licensees they will develop products that 'further the ability of [ ] nonMicrosoft server operating systems to provide a platform which com-.
1 More important, the provision was "aspirapetes with Windows itself."' 123
tional, rather than premised upon certain benchmarks" 2 4 in product
development. The goal of the final judgments generally was to foreclose
illegal conduct, not necessarily to eliminate or to reduce Microsoft's lawfully acquired monopoly power. 25 Thus, for Judge Kollar-Kotelly,
Microsoft's compliance depends upon the completeness and accuracy
of the documentation, not necessarily upon the number of licensees or
the types of products they produce. If Microsoft produces complete and
accurate documentation, the fact that there are no licensees with platform potential would apparently not prevent a finding of compliance.
Once again, the standard by which the court measures the completeness
and accuracy of the documentation is decisive.
This reasoning recognizes, yet oddly fails to address, the glaring disconnect between plaintiffs' enforcement activities and any real-world
benefit to developers or users. If it were the case that improving the
documentation would attract more licensees, one would have expected
the number of licensees to increase more rapidly in recent years. Despite the enormous increases in staffing by Microsoft and the TC, the
improvements in the documentation, the provision of unlimited technical support, the reduction in the price of the license to zero, and extensive efforts in evangelizing the protocols, fewer than fifty firms have
signed licenses, a rate of fewer than ten per year. Microsoft asserted in
late 2005, without contradiction, that it was "unaware of any existing or
potential licensee that has been unable to use any Communications Protocol because of flaws in the documentation." 26 That statement apparently remains true. All of the developers with an interest in using
123Id.
124Id.
125Id. at 178.

126Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 14-15,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 2004) [hereinafterJSR October 2004], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f205700/205751.pdf.
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Microsoft's protocols have access to them, with voluminous technical
documentation and unlimited technical support. Thus, any actual licensee has the tools, with the assistance of Microsoft's technical support, to
overcome any flaws in the documentation in its own implementation. In
a recent status report, Microsoft listed only twelve outstanding TDIs of a
total of 1,276 that had been identified by licensees. 127 The conclusion is
inescapable that the TDI-based standard the plaintiffs and the court are
applying is inappropriate to the needs of any real-world licensee.
The most plausible explanation for the dearth of licensees is that
most developers writing to non-Microsoft servers do not need the protocols and documentation, no matter how complete, accurate, and usable
they are. As the court recognized in its remedy opinion, there are various ways of achieving interoperability between Windows clients and applications running on Windows servers, only one of which is to use
Microsoft's proprietary, native communications protocols. Developers
may, for example, add their own software to the Windows client and,
thus, achieve interoperability using the standard Windows API. 12a Alternatively, they may use standard protocols supported by Windows without
a license. It is difficult to say how significant an increment in interoperability the native protocols provide. Now that Microsoft has posted the
documentation on its Web site for free, the number of official licensees
will become even less related to the competitive impact of the decree. 129
From a competitive point of view, there is an even more fundamental
flaw in the final judgments' focus on documenting native protocols. As
127JSRJune 2008, supra note 82, at 12-13. Microsoft added that:
As to the category "TDIs identified by licensees," in most cases licensees do not
open TDIs themselves. Licensees generally ask Microsoft questions about the
documentation. Most questions do not result in any TDIs. In some cases, questions from licensees result in a TDI being filed by the Microsoft employees involved in answering the licensees' questions. In these circumstances, Microsoft
categorizes the TDI as a licensee TDI.
Id. at 11 n.7. This passage implicitly makes clear that Microsoft resolves all but a handful
of issues raised by licensees through its technical support.
128Interestingly, the states that were moving to extend the term of other provisions of
the final judgments raised "the possibility that an MCPP licensee who writes an application using software hosted on a server will also wish to add 'software to the client to take
advantage of the functionality that the server provides,'" observing that "certain companies, including Apple, Yahoo!, and Google, are already making use of a product approach
that involves both server-side and client-side components, albeit via internet standard protocols rather than Microsoft's proprietary protocols." D.D.C.Decree Extension 2008, 531 F.
Supp. 2d at 171-72. The court endorsed this scenario, even though, as Microsoft noted,
products that involve adding software to the client or that rely on industry standard protocols would not be affected by the § III.E disclosures. Id. at 172.
129 Parts of the documentation had been downloaded over 146,000 times, as of June
2008. JSRJune 2008, supra note 82, at 9.
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we have seen, the goal of Section III.E is to preserve the middleware
threat to the applications barrier to entry that protects the Windows monopoly in client operating systems. To the extent that threat ever existed
for middleware running on either the client or server operating systems,
it has been largely superseded by far more potent platform threats: Apple and Web services. Because Apple now uses Intel chips, it is undeniably a direct competitor of Microsoft. Its latest operating system is a
dangerous rival for all versions of the Windows client, at least in the
consumer space. Perhaps more significantly, versions of many of the
most popular client applications run on Web servers rather than the
client operating system.130 Any user with an Internet connection and a
standards-compliant browser now can access powerful programs running on non-Microsoft servers.
Microsoft argued in the extension proceedings that this proliferation
of Web services had accomplished by a different avenue what the court
had sought to achieve by Section III.E. Judge Kollar-Kotelly, however,
refused to accept that Web services had made Section III.E irrelevant
because new licenses under the provision "will presumably amplify
whatever progress the proliferation of Web-based computing has made
towards 'eliminat[ing] the consequences of Microsoft's illegal conduct."' 13' But, as we have shown, it is unlikely that further efforts to improve the documentation under the current standards will greatly
increase the number of licenses. Consequently, the protocols' amplification of the competitive effects of Web services in the market for client
operating systems is likely to be slight.
Judge Kollar-Kotelly was careful to distinguish competition in the market for client operating systems from competition in the market for
server operating systems. Only the former was at issue in the U.S.
Microsoft case: the goal of Section III.E was to foster the development of
middleware running on servers that would reduce the applications barrier to entry into the market for client operating systems. Consequently,
she rejected as irrelevant the states' argument in the extension proceedings "that Microsoft has 'consolidated its hold on the server market' dur130See, e.g., Rachael King, How Cloud Computing Is Changing the World, Bus. WK., Aug. 4,
2008, available at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/aug2008/tc20080
82_445669.htm (reporting one estimate "that 12% of the worldwide software market
would go to the cloud in" five years); Miguel Helft, Google Pushes to Make BrowserApplications More Powerful, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2008, available at http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/
2008/05/28/google-pushes-to-make-browser-applications-more-powerful/index.html
]
(quoting Google's vice president of engineering as stating that "[i f it was Windows versus
the Web, the Web has won").
131D.D.C. Decree Extension 2008, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 175.
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13 2
ing the five years that the Final Judgments have been effect.
However, the European Microsoft case, which did focus on the market
for server operating systems, has had one effect that has important implications for the enforcement of the U.S. judgments: the Samba project, which produces server products that emulate Microsoft's, has
obtained a license to the protocol documentation.'3 3 As we argue in the
next Part, Samba is such an important player in the server market that
its role as a licensee can provide an important benchmark for compliance with the U.S. judgment.

C.

FLAWED DOCUMENTATION

As we have shown in the last two Parts, Judge Kollar-Kotelly found that
Microsoft had, "practically speaking," failed to comply with Section III.E
because the documentation was not "certifiably complete, accurate, and
usable"13 4:
As of the last status conference held in this case on September 11,
2007, Microsoft had released all initial versions of the rewritten technical documentation to the TC for testing, but the TC and Plaintiffs were
far from concluding that the documentation was "substantially complete." The parties and the TC continue to conduct intensive testing of
the technical documentation, and to review the corresponding overview/reference materials that Microsoft makes available to licensees. In
addition, while the first consulting firm's audit of Microsoft's internal
audit is complete, the second consulting firm's efforts are ongoing.
Further, in its January 15, 2008 Supplemental Status Report, Microsoft
reported that it is still in discussions with the TC regarding the overview/reference materials, and that testing of the rewritten documentation continues, with over 900 TDIs outstanding against the new
documentation. 135
The court placed the blame for the flaws in the documentation
squarely on Microsoft. The TC, according to the court, had been unerringly fair and competent. Judge Kollar-Kotelly even thought it appropriate to
commend [ ] the members of the TC as ...one of the most successful
aspects of the Final Judgments, because it has been invaluable in facilitating the Plaintiffs' enforcement efforts ....[T]he TC has provided
the Plaintiffs with crucial technical expertise by providing advice and
evaluating Microsoft's compliance with the Final Judgments. The TC

132Id. at
133 Page

176.

& Childers, supra note 67, at 346-48.
1 The court stated this formulation eight times. See D.D.C. Decree Extension 2008, 531 F.
Supp. 2d at 144, 163, 170, 175 (twice), 181, 183 n.34, 184.
'35 Id. at 163 (citations omitted).
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has gone far beyond the simple "monitoring" with which it was tasked
in the Settling States' Final Judgment... to providing testing, feedto
back, and critiques that have proved critical to the Plaintiffs' efforts
136
maximize the full potential of the Final Judgments' remedies.
The court voiced not a single word of criticism of the TC's efforts, either

in testing or in evaluating the documentation. In doing so, the court
in essence appointed the TC as the sole arbiter of the sufficiency of the
documentation under the standards laid down by the plaintiffs. By
including the word "certifiably" in its test for compliance with the documentation requirement, the court evidently meant suitable for certification by the TC.
The plaintiffs have conceded that the quality of the documentation
has improved as Microsoft has met the prescribed milestones in the
most recent standard. The plaintiffs expressed confidence that
"Microsoft. will continue to improve the documents over time, based on
feedback from the TC's implementation and validation projects and
from Microsoft's own test suite project."' v Judge Kollar-Kotelly appeared to agree:
From all reports, it appears that Microsoft has finally committed the
resources necessary, and adopted an approach likely to produce technical documentation that is complete, accurate, and usable to licensees. In light of the current RESET plan schedule and the parties' most
recent reports, the Court is unaware of any reason that the technical
documentation required by Section III.E should not be complete, accurate, and usable to licensees long before Section III.E expires [in
November 2009].138

In the most recent status reports, however, the plaintiffs make no representations about the likely date at which compliance will be achieved.
Microsoft's tables in the reports suggest that TDIs continue to be gener13 9
ated at least as quickly as they are resolved.

Although the court has made the quality of the documentation its
current criterion for compliance, it remains unclear whether meeting
that standard will be sufficient to justify allowing the decree to expire.
Judge Kollar-Kotelly cautioned:
[T]he door remains open for the Court to reassess the need for continued oversight as the expiration of the Final Judgments in November
2009 approaches. At that point, certifiably complete, accurate, and useable technical documentation will, presumably, be available to licen136Id. at 157.

137JSR February 2008, supra note 79, at 3.
'38D.D.C. Decree Extension 2008, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 182-83.
139 ]SRJune 2008, supra note 82, at 12-13; JSR February 2008, supra note 79, at 18.
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sees, and the Court will be in a far better position to evaluate Section
111E's implementation, as well as the role that the other
provisions of
40
the Final Judgments play in supporting Section III.E.'
This language appears to contemplate a further inquiry beyond compliance with the disclosure and licensing requirements to determine if
Microsoft has met its obligations.
IV. A MARKET-BASED MEASURE OF COMPLIANCE
Antitrust remedies should ordinarily be confined to stopping proven
violations and preventing their recurrence. As the D.C. Circuit wrote in
its 2001 opinion, a judgment should be "tailored to fit the wrong creating the occasion for the remedy.' 41 If the defendant's illegal conduct
ends, the market's own forces usually will act to destroy inefficient monopolies. 142 When courts attempt to go beyond these bounds, the results
are likely to be costly and ineffective, and potentially harmful to competitive markets. The protocol licensing provision departs from these standards because it does not respond to proven violations, does not satisfy
any demonstrable market need, and because it requires the creation
and marketing of an immensely complex product that never existed
before.
For the remainder of this article, however, we assume that parties
were correct to undertake this task in the consent decree and that the
court was correct to approve it. The question remains what standard the
court should apply to determine whether the defendant has complied
with the provision. We agree with Judge Kollar-Kotelly that the standard
should not be whether a licensee has actually created a platform that
rivals the Windows client. Once the court has removed artificial barriers
to the entry of middleware developers, the market will determine which
platform succeeds. We also agree that the fact that the defendant has
expended enormous resources should not be a measure of compliance.
Finally, we agree that the standard of compliance should be whether the
documentation is complete, accurate, and usable. We disagree, however,
that the measure of completeness, accuracy, and usability should be
whether the plaintiffs certify the documentation as completely free of
issues.

140 D.D.C. Decree Extension

2008, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 184.

141
D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 107.
142 Network effects complicate this analysis because they can make market power more
durable, but they do not change the general point that markets have powerful self-correcting mechanisms. For further discussion of the relationship between network effects
and market power, see PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 1, ch. 3.
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Because the goal of any antitrust remedy is to restore competitive conditions to the market, a court should evaluate a remedy by the standards
of the market. Accordingly, the project should be judged by the criteria
that competitive software developers would apply. The goal should be to
remove real obstacles to the entry of platform developers. The software
at issue in this case is a form of platform interface. If a competitive producer of a software platform were to choose to extract and document its
interfaces in an effort to maximize its products' interoperability with rival platforms, it would not apply a standard of perfection to its documentation. In this Part, we offer a brief outline of what a market-based
measure of compliance would entail. We also note that, perhaps ironically, the European antitrust authorities have apparently adopted something like a market-based standard in implementing their protocol
licensing order against Microsoft.
A. Som

wARE DEVELOPMENT UNDER MARKET CONSTRAINTS

To create a new product, commercial software developers first formulate a concept of what the software will do and express the concept in a
set of "requirements definitions" for programmers. 143 Programmers evaluate the feasibility of developing software that meets the requirements
definitions and estimate the time and money needed accomplish that
task. 144 Once the programmers have returned a detailed, feature-by-feature budgetary estimate, management can then consider the costs projected to develop the features. At this point, management makes
adjustments or negotiates with the programmers to refine the requirements to make the time and expense of the project manageable. The
primary consideration in defining requirements is customer acceptance.
Every feature the programmers create should be something customers
actually want. 45 Features that sound good in initial brainstorming but
have no practical use needlessly increase costs and delay. Even a useful
feature may be inefficient to produce if the cost of its development out143P.M. HEATHCOTE, 'A' LEVEL ICT 183 (2003) (discussing "establishing the [project's]
objectives" in terms of measurable (quantitative) and descriptive (qualitative) terms);
JOHN MCMANUS, MANAGING STAKEHOLDERS IN SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 1 (2004)
(describing objectives in terms of "stakes" held by "stakeholders" as real-world interests,
concerns, perceptions of rights, expectations, or even ownership).
44
1 JEFFREY 0. GRADY, SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 7 (2006); DEAN LEFFINGWELL &
DON WIDRIG, MANAGING SoFrwARaE REQUIREMENTS 7 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing project fail-

ures due to poor specifications management).
145See id. at 93 ("Understanding user and stakeholder needs moves us from the technical domain of bits and bytes, where many developers are most comfortable, into the domain of real people and real-world problems."). For an entertaining discussion of the
process of identifying which features to build, see Joel Spolsky, Set Your Priorities (Oct.
12, 2005), http://www.joelonsoftware.com/articles/SetYourPriorities.html.
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weighs its utility and, hence, its contribution to the value (and the profit
14 6
potential) of the product.
Once the programmers, the marketing team, and management have
approved a final set of requirements, the programmers develop a project plan, which includes a detailed list of tasks, milestones, and objectives. A project manager keeps a current schedule of what tasks the team
has completed, what is remaining, and- what is overdue. The project
manager can adjust the plan based on unforeseen developments.147 At
any time, the project manager should be able to predict when the product will be ready to ship.
In the past, programmers often worked on a product until a complete
initial version of the product was ready, and then released that version
to testing essentially for the first time. 148 Under the most favored current
development method, however, the programming team makes regular
daily or weekly releases of live code to an internal testing team. 149 This
approach allows internal testers to focus on discrete components of the
product as they become available and to gain experience with the product. Testers become an essential part of the development process by
providing discipline and regular feedback to the programmers. 150
Management also benefits by receiving feedback from the programming
46

1 LEFFINGWELL & WIDRIG, supra note 144, at 44-45 (describing development as the
most expensive alternative, and suggesting other ways to reframe user desires and perceptions in order to avoid the development expense). Marketing people may help the developers determine what potential customers want and, equally important, what they will pay
for it.
47

1

MCMANUS,

supra note 143, at 1 (describing the project manager's function as plan-

ning, executing, measuring monitoring, controlling, and reducing project risk); LEmNGWELL & WIDRIG, supra note 144, at 185 (describing the role of a project manager in a
software development company).
148PHILIP G. ARMOUR, THE LAWS OF SOFTWARE PROCESS: A NEW MODEL FOR THE PRODUCTION AND MANAGEMENT OF SOFTWARE

102 (2003) (discussing "the problems of big pro-

cess"); see also id. at 110 (discussing the benefits of the modern "extreme programming"
paradigm featuring frequent small releases).
149Id. at 97 (describing the ascension of the "Agile" software development methodology
including frequent regular releases of code); id. at 109 (same regarding "Extreme Programming" methodology); TORGEIR DINGSOYR, SOFTWARE PROCESS IMPROVEMENT: 11TH
EUROPEAN CONFERENCE 1 (2004) ("Extreme programming (XP) ... is focused on generating early releases of working products and aims to deliver business value from the very
beginning of the project."); DWAYNE PHILIPS, THE SOFTWARE PROJECT MANAGER'S HANDBOOK: PRINCIPLES THAT WORK AT WORK 173 (2004) (describing the "Agile" software development methodology). Internal testing refers to the iterative process where developers
provide regular releases to internal quality assurance testers for feedback. These internal
testers are not using the software necessarily the way a customer might, but are confirming that requirements are being met and tolerances achieved. See also id. at 39 (defining
what is a software "methodology").
150See PHILIPS, supra note 149, at 167 (describing the Microsoft development process
emphasizing "testing during development instead of at the end" and "[t]he testers use
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team throughout the course of the project. Regular testing thus helps
ensure that the project meets its time and quality objectives. Software
that meets the memorialized feature requirements (the "specification")
and that has been approved by an external alpha testing team'
qualifies as a "release candidate," ready for beta testing'52 by potential
customers.
There are industry definitions, like ISO 9126,113 that measure software
testing quality in terms of functionality, reliability, efficiency, portability,
maintainability, compatibility, and usability. 15 4 Developers may also measure the quality of a product under development by comparing code
output to pre-written "test cases," "use cases," or "test scripts."'55 Given a
formal requirement definition, testing teams at an early stage can create
narrative "scripts" describing what actions a user might take using a
given set of information, 156 and then describe specifically how the system
should respond or process the information. 57 Programmers often use
[the specification] to write the tests for the code the programmers are [concurrently]
writing").
151"Alpha testing" is a limited form of external testing where the code is sent to a dedicated testing team or to a selected potential customer or customers. Software in the alpha
testing stage is not considered viable or stable enough for "real" use. HEATHCOTE, supra
note 143, at 339 (defining alpha testing).
152 "Beta testing" occurs when software is released to a limited set of potential end-user
customers. These customers may or may not be trained in formal testing procedures, but
are usually invited to report errors or unexpected behaviors to a designated contact. Beta
code may or may not be considered stable enough for "real" use by customers. Sometimes
the developer needs feedback that can only be provided by actual use of the product in
real-life "battlefield" conditions. "Acceptance testing" is final testing performed by a customer who is purchasing the product. This generally occurs in situations where a customer has ordered a custom software product be designed for its unique purposes. Id.
153See ISO 9126 Software Quality Characteristics, http://www.sqa.net/iso9126.html (for
a summary of the standard).
154See also PHILIPS, supra note 149, at 166-67 (describing Microsoft's "three dimensions
of quality" as reliability (how good the product must be before shipping), feature set (the
specifications or requirements), and schedule (the ship date)").
155 See LEFFINGWELL & WIDRIG, supra note 144, at 148. In formal software design terms, a
test "script" usually refers to a program (a "script") that automates some portion of the
testing process. But in general parlance, the terms test "case" and test "script" are used
interchangeably. See also WILLIAM E. LEWIS, SOFTWARE TESTING AND CONTINUOUS QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT 44 (2000) ("[a] test script guides the tester through a test and ensures
consistency among separate executions of the test").
5
1 6 A given set of testing information is often referred to as a "case" or a "use case."
157 See, e.g., HEATHCOTE, supra note 143, at 189 (providing examples of how to draw up a
test plan and how to choose tests for the test plan); see also id. at 193 (stating "[t]esting is a
vitally important part of the project" and describing how a comprehensive test plan
should be created and verified as complete at the outset of the project); LEFFINGWELL &
WIDRIG, supra note 144, at 157 (describing the concept of "storyboarding" a use case);
ARMOUR, supra note 148, at 13 (describing need for a rule-based statement of need as well
as a specific detailed real-world example); LEWIS, supra note 155, at 157 (describing a
process for creating process-based test scripts).
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these test scripts as guides for their development work. Later, the testers
use the scripts to confirm whether the programmers have met the requirements. 158 Scripts can be enhanced or modified during the course
of development as the project's needs evolve.
A crucial constraint guiding all aspects of the development process is
the ship date. 59 A developer must be ready to sell usable software to
customers by the ship date or suffer losses. Before the product ships,
software development is a continuing investment that generates no revenue. 60 Thus, from the beginning of the project, the ship date imposes a
critical discipline on everyone involved. Because a workable product
must ship by a certain date in order to make a profit, a development
firm knows that it will certainly ship an imperfect product.' 61 Perfection
is unattainable, if only because the underlying technologies are themselves imperfect and because customer expectations are fluid.162 Consequently, the programmers know that to deliver market-acceptable
software by the ship date, they must plan to write the most difficult and
important pieces of the project first to give the testers more time with
those features. 63 The testers, in turn, must prioritize their feedback to
the developers to fix the most challenging problems first. The closer a
project gets to the ship date, the more the testing team must scrutinize
its feedback and evaluate which items are necessary for market accepta-

158 See LEFFINGWELL & WIDRIG, supra note 144, at 310 ("Deriving Test Cases from Use
Cases").
159 See MIKE GUNDERLOY, PAINLESS PROJECT MANAGEMENT WITH FOGBUGZ 4 (2007)
(describing "evidence based" software development management system designed primarily to predict the ship date); ARMOUR, supra note 148, at 66 (discussing decision process
regarding selecting an acceptable level of defects in order to meet the ship date); id. at 15
(observing that "the only natural goal of a software [development] group should be to
put itself out of business as soon as possible"); PHILIPS, supra note 149, at 167 (describing
one of the three dimensions of quality as the "schedule [which] is the ship date").
160See TOM LovE, OBJECT LESSONS: LESSONS LEARNED IN OBJECT-ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS 243 (1993) (emphasizing the need to "[k]eep development costs under control
...
[s]uccessful software companies spend less than 20% of total expenses on R&D").
161MICHAEL A. CUSUMANO & RICHARD W. SELBY, MICROSOFr SECRETS: HOW THE WORLD'S
MOST POWERFUL SOFTWARE COMAPANY CREATES TECHNOLOGY, SHAPES MARKETS, AND MANAGES PEOPLE 89 (1995)
PHILIPS, supra note 149,

(noting the "trade-off between functionality and ship-date");
at 167 (describing the primary concept of "[rieliability [as] how
good the product must be before shipping").
16 2
See PHILIPS, supra note 149, at 167 ("'Good enough' software is a variation of the test
completion measure. Shipping a product containing known errors is not new.... ."); RICK
D. CRAIG & STEFAN P. JASKIEL, SYSTEMATIC SOFTWARE TESTING 267 (2002) (observing that
"[s]ometimes the risk of not shipping (due to competition, failure of an existing system,
etc., may exceed the (business) risk of shipping a flawed product").
163 SeeCRAIG &JASKIEL, supra note 162, at 69 (noting the need to "intelligently choos[e]
what not to test (i.e., low-risk features), rather than just running out of time and not
testing whatever was left on the ship date").
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bility, even if they must leave a desirable feature on the table. 64 This
imperative explains why "version 1.0" of a software project invariably
ships with a feature set that is not yet fully developed. 165 Some of the
most successful software products shipped unremarkable, or even notorious, first versions that improved only after marketplace acceptance
and use. 166 Maintenance of the software after shipping provides additional real-world testing and opportunities for improvement.
Of course, no ship date is absolute. If the demands are exigent, managers can extend the date. Indeed, some software firms claim that they
will not ship software before it is "ready," suggesting that any ship date
will always give way to concerns about quality. Still, no matter how wellintentioned the developer, practical economic concerns govern every
project. Venture capital does not flow indefinitely without tangible economic results-the shipment of a commercial product.1 67
One type of product commonly associated with platform software is
the software development kit (SDK), which enables developers of
software applications to write compatible programs. Intel, for example,
in promoting its platform distributed tools like software libraries "along
with specifications information contained in informal working documents such as white papers . . . to train [software] designers and help
them develop appropriate complements." 68 Intel's engineers developed
these tools "primarily for their own benefit," but disseminated them in
SDKs to a growing network of developers, with necessary technical support. 69 The development of documentation for an API is analogous to
development of an SDK. 76 The process of developing and supporting
164Id. at 266 (observing that "[a]t some point . . . the cost of continuing to test will
exceed the value derived from the additional testing").
165See PHILIPS, supra note 149, at 167 (observing that "Microsoft [normally] ships
software containing known errors ...
but the software works well enough for the vast
majority of intended users ... Microsoft will both work into the long tail of the 90/10
[
rule-of-work curve"); CRAIG &JASKIEL, supra note 162, at 267 (observing that " m] any of us
have certainly recommended the release of a product that we felt was fairly poor in quality
Remember, we're not strivbecause it was better than what the user[s] currently had [-]

ing for perfection, only acceptable risk") (emphasis added).
166See PHILIPS, supra note 149, at 167.
167 See, e.g., CRAIG &JASKIEL, supra note 162, at 267 (describing a case where the software
development company wrote a best of breed tax application, but held it from release until
very high-quality standards were met, and by the time of shipment, most potential customers had already purchased an inferior competitive product and were out of the market).
168 ANNABELLE GAWER & MICHAEL A. CuSuMANo, PLATFORM LEADERSHIP: How INTEL,
MICROSOIr, AND Cisco DRIVE INDUSTRY INNOVATION 61 (2002).
169Id.
70

1 Not least is the concept that an SDK, like API documentation, is developed primarily

for the use of developers.
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such an SDK would follow the same methods of design, testing, and
management as other software development projects.
B.

EVALUATING THE PROTOCOL DOCUMENTATION PROJECT BY
MARKET STANDARDS

The implementation of Section III.E is analogous to the creation of a
software development kit for Microsoft's native communications protocols. The primary difference is that the goal of the project is to assist
developers in writing applications for Microsoft's rivals' server platforms
rather than for Microsoft's own. Thus, rather than providing libraries of
code for standard tasks, Microsoft must write pseudo-code to describe
the functionality of the interfaces. To evaluate the success of such a project, a court should look to the best practices that a competitive platform
producer would use to accomplish the same goal. The process would
follow the principles we have outlined above: definition of requirements
based on real-world needs, testing directed to those requirements, and
the establishment of a meaningful ship date with binding consequences
for late shipment for both parties. Once the product has shipped, under
that standard, compliance should be measured by meeting the needs of
actual developers who are using the software in real-world scenarios. As
we explain more fully below, this strategy is particularly appropriate now
that one of those licensees is the Samba project, which is extraordinarily
well placed to identify relevant flaws in both protocols and documentation. Under our suggested approach, the TC and the court can monitor
compliance by the defendant's resolution of development problems in
concrete cases.
Microsoft's failure to produce compliant documentation by the original expiration date of the final judgments amounts to a costly budget
overrun on a software development project. Judge Kollar-Kotelly blamed
the overrun on Microsoft's inability to foresee the level of resources required to produce acceptable interoperability documentation. But another shortcoming of the project was a lack of discipline that would have
been imposed by practical commercial considerations in a market-based
scenario, particularly consumer acceptance and the ship date. The set of
possible features for any software product is enormous. To succeed, a
development project must limit its features to commercially useful ones.
A commercial developer would establish a detailed set of requirements by evaluating real-world customer needs and meeting them efficiently within appropriate time constraints. By contrast, the Microsoft
documentation is measured against a standard of perfection without
meaningful time limits. The TC's staff has functioned like a carefully
isolated alpha-testing facility. Rather than developing testing scripts or
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use cases based on what developers actually want, however, the TC has
developed prototype implementations. From available descriptions,
these implementations appear to be more like automated tests based on
the documentation Microsoft already produced than standalone scenarios describing tasks real-world licensees would have to accomplish.
Thus, the development of test cases by the TC, rather than real-world
needs, defines what the Microsoft developers are required to do. The
seeming endless generation of TDIs bears no necessary relationship to
the needs of developers. Instead of a ship date, the parties faced the
expiration of the final judgments. Under the court's standard of compliance, however, if the documentation is not certifiably complete, accurate, and useable, the deadline must be extended. Since the plaintiffs
control that certification, the deadline imposes no constraint on them.
Indeed, because Microsoft bears all of the costs of enforcement, there is
little incentive for the plaintiffs, who favor extension of the final judgments at least until 2012,171 to bring the project to a close.
Microsoft has claimed, without contradiction by the plaintiffs, that it is
"unaware of any existing or potential licensee that has been unable to
use any Communications Protocol because of flaws in the documentation."'72 Moreover, although Microsoft has not formally contested the
plaintiffs' standards of compliance, it "firmly believes that the current
protocol documentation available to implementers is fully useable and
complies completely with the Final Judgments." 75 The competitive
model supports this view, primarily because developers are already using
the documentation to produce real-world products. Indeed, as we have
noted, under the current program, only a handful of issues developers
raised are ever reported as TDIs: most are simply resolved by Microsoft's
technical support. Prototype implementations might be justified as a
form of alpha testing because of the plaintiffs' special needs in implementing a supervised judgment. Once the product has been released to
licensees, however, the focus should shift to the suitability of the documentation to their actual and potential needs. Microsoft and the TC can
identify and address flaws in the protocols or the documentation based
171
D.D.C. Decree Extension 2008, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 181-84 (declining to extend the judgments beyond November 12, 2009, but leaving open "the possibility of doing so in the
future"). Microsoft has agreed that the plaintiffs have the sole discretion to move to extend the enforcement of Section III.E until 2012, and that Microsoft would not oppose
the motion. Id. at 162. Because the court's refusal to extend the other provisions judgments the extra three years is contingent on Microsoft's creation of compliant documentation, the plaintiffs would seem to have an incentive to demonstrate the documentation
remains flawed indefinitely.
172JSR October 2004, supra note 126, at 14-15.
173JSR February 2008, supra note 79, at 15.
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upon issues generated by development. One source of information
could involve monitoring support measures. The announcement of the
interoperability principles and the publication of the documentation on
Microsoft's Web site have allowed anyone interested in the documentation to use it for their development projects. Users can post issues to
Microsoft Developer Network user forums and receive assistance from
Microsoft or from other developers. 17 4 The court and the TC can monitor Microsoft's resolution of these issues.
Interestingly, the European Commission has apparently applied
something like the approach we propose in its evaluation of the documentation Microsoft has created for the Workgroup Server Protocol
Program, which includes server-to-server protocols. Last fall, the European Commission announced that Microsoft was in compliance:
In line with the 2004 Decision Microsoft now provides the interoperability information on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. The
interoperability information made available by Microsoft also appears
to be complete and accurate to an extent that a software development project
can be based on it. Therefore, the Commission considers that Microsoft
is now complying with its obligations under the 2004 Decision. However, licensees may raise additional issues when they obtain access to
the information and Microsoft must keep the interoperability
informa17 5
tion updated and fix errors on an ongoing basis.
This passage explicitly measures compliance based on the usability of
the software by a real development project, subject to a condition of
continuing support.
As we noted in the last Part, it is significant that the Samba project,
which produces server software that emulates Microsoft's server operating systems, obtained a license to Microsoft's protocols and documenta176
tion following the resolution of the 2007 European Microsoft decision.
The Samba team's use of Section III.E is likely to lead to better practical
documentation than anything the TC's staff might do at this.stage. The
Samba project is particularly qualified in this regard because its entire
development model is based on protocol analysis. As the Samba team
members explore and then apply the information disclosed by
Microsoft, they will ask questions, report problems, and provide external
reinforcement of the documentation's usefulness in their own forums.
174 See MSDN Forums: Open Protocol Specifications, http://forums.microsoft.com/
MSDN/default.aspx?ForumGrouplD=573&SiteID=l.
175 Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Ensures Microsoft's Compliance with the 2004 Decision-Frequently Asked Questions (emphasis added), available
at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/420&format=
HTML&aged=O&language=EN&guiLanguage=EN.
176 Page & Childers, supra note 67, at 346-48.
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Customers using Samba-based networks all over the world will provide
feedback to the Samba team, who in turn will attempt to rely on the
Microsoft documentation to solve those real problems. Should the documentation prove insufficient or be of poor quality, the Samba team will
certainly complain. Microsoft will, as it is organized to do as a commercial software and technical documentation developer, respond to those
developers' complaints and improve the documentation in successive
versions.
V. CONCLUSION
Section III.E of the final judgments in the American Microsoft case has
been the focus of tfie parties' efforts to implement the final judgments
during their initial five-year term. The problems of enforcing the provision became so acute that the parties agreed in 2006 to extend that provision for up to five more years. The same problems have now provided
grounds for extension of most of the other provisions in judgments for
at least two years. The enormous costs of this process coupled with its
meager results suggest that the court shouild reconsider the standards of
compliance with Section III.E. The current approach focuses on identifying flaws in the technical documentation by using it to create prototype implementations of the protocols with no necessary relationship to
market needs. We suggest that the parties and the court should redirect
the inquiry to whether the defendant has produced documentation and
support methods that meet the standards of the market and that are
sufficient to meet the needs of developers.

